Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself.
C. Self, philosophy the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Thomas Nagel on I, Ego, Self - Dictionary of Arguments
Frank I 506ff I/Nagel: identification of an objective person as myself; adds no fact to the world - therefore, such identity statements are not understandable for us! >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Facts, >Nonfactualism. E.g. whether I imagine that my house burns down and I am present or not makes no difference to what one imagines as being the case. EvansVs: an identity statement does not need to make a difference for a spatiotemporal map of the world, but for the manner in which the immediate environment is considered. >Identity, >Statement, >Reality, >Mapping. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 - - - Nagel III 31 I/objectivism/Nagel: there is a problem of a liberal realist worldview, everyone must admit to themselves that they are a person in a center-less world who is no one else but themselves. Cf. >Centererd worlds. III 33 Distinction I/person/Nagel: allows to ask: how can I be this specific person? - What kind of fact is that? >Person. Problem in the center-less world. Solution: "objective self" which we identify with the "I" - the "self" has the ability to form an idea about the person in the world. - In doing so, it refrains from the standpoint of "I am". - The real self excludes the contingent person Thomas Nagel and his perspective as content in its worldview. >Self._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
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> Counter arguments against Nagel
> Counter arguments in relation to I, Ego, Self
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28